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Implied Indemnity in Illinois
INTRODUCTION
Under the common-law principle of joint and several liability, a
single tortfeasor may be held liable for the entire loss sustained by
an injured party even though the tortfeasor's act concurred with or
combined with the act of another or others to produce the injury.
A tortfeasor also may be held liable for subsequent injuries proxi-
mately caused by the tortfeasor's original wrongful act.2 At com-
mon law, the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors 3
prevented a party held liable for injury caused in part by the con-
duct of another from shifting part of the burden to the other
wrongdoer.4 The common law, however, also recognized a right to
implied indemnity which, in appropriate circumstances, permitted
a tortfeasor to recoup his entire loss from another tortfeasor.5
In 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court extinguished the common-
law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors.6 Thereafter,
judges and juries were free to apportion liability as they saw fit
1. Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 119-20, 454 N.E.2d 197, 204 (1983)
(citing Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 111. 2d 28, 43, 139 N.E. 2d 275, 284 (1956);
Nordhaus v. Vandalia R.R., 242 I11. 166, 174, 89 N.E. 974, 978 (1909); Wabash, St. L. &
Pac. Ry. v. Shacklet, 105 Ill. 364, 381 (1883)); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 247 (4th ed. 1971).
2. J. DOOLEY, I MODERN TORT LAW § 8.03 (1982); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at
297.
3. The precise meaning of the expression "joint tortfeasor" has been the subject of
much debate. The term was once limited to intentional tortfeasors who acted in concert,
but it has evolved to include negligent tortfeasors whose acts result in a single indivisible
injury to the plaintiff. Erickson v. Gliden, 76 Ill. App. 3d 218, 219, 394 N.E.2d 1076,
1078 (2d Dist. 1979) (indivisibility of the resultant injury is the test of jointness). See
Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 131 n.9
(1932). In Illinois, the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act changed the basis for
the definition of joint tortfeasor from the indivisibility of the resultant injury to liability
for the same injury for causes of action which arose on or after March 1, 1978. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 70, 301, 302(a) (1983). See infra note 63 for the text of this provision.
4. See infra notes 18, 22-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 17-56 and accompanying text.
6. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 16, 374 N.E.2d
437, 444 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Pack-
age Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
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whenever contribution was appropriate.' The court, however,
failed to address those situations in which, prior to the adoption of
contribution, implied indemnity had permitted as a matter of law
the complete shifting of liability from one tortfeasor to another.'
When the legislature codified the court's decision in the Contribu-
tion Among Joint Tortfeasors Act ("Contribution Act"), 9 it too
failed to address the status of implied indemnity.'° Various panels
of the Illinois Appellate Court have disagreed as to the viability of
implied indemnity after the adoption of contribution."
This note will address the status of implied indemnity in Illinois.
After a brief description of implied indemnity 12 and contribution,' 3
this note will review appellate court treatment of the relationship
between contribution and implied indemnity. '4 This note then will
consider whether public policy suggests that implied indemnity
should survive the adoption of contribution.' 5 Finally, principles
of statutory construction will be used to examine the relationship
between the Contribution Act and implied indemnity.' 6 This note
will conclude that implied indemnity is still a viable concept in
Illinois.
7. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
8. The majority opinion in Skinner did not consider the status of indemnity. Justice
Dooley, in dissent, indicated that the court should have resolved the relationship between
indemnity and contribution. He believed the following questions should have been ad-
dressed: "What is the status of the tortfeasor who had a right to bonafide indemnity, not
contribution? Has this right been impaired? Has the active-passive criterion of implied
indemnity been abolished?" Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d
at 38-39, 374 N.E.2d at 454 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301-05 (1983). See infra note 63 for relevant portions
of the text of the statute.
10. See infra note 63.
11. See, e.g., Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Ill. App. 3d 607, 610, 479 N.E.2d 333, 336
(5th Dist. 1985) (indemnity survived in cases involving a pre-tort relationship which gives
rise to a duty to indemnify); Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Iil. App. 3d 666, 676, 475
N.E.2d 1383, 1390 (5th Dist. 1985) (the Contribution Act extinguished all indemnity
claims); Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 98-99, 463 N.E.2d 792, 806 (5th
Dist. 1984) (indemnity claims based upon upstream strict liability survived the adoption
of contribution). See infra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 17-53 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 148-92 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND
Indemnity in Illinois
Since Merryweather v. Nixan,'7 the venerable case most often
cited as the source of the common-law rule against contribution
among joint tortfeasors,' 8 courts have distinguished between con-
tribution and indemnity. 19 Where two or more parties are held lia-
ble in tort to an injured party, contribution allows apportionment
of liability among them.2 0 Indemnity, on the other hand, tradition-
ally allowed a party who was legally responsible to a plaintiff for
the plaintiffs damages, but who was not guilty of any fault or
wrongdoing, to recoup his entire loss from a party whose fault or
wrongful conduct actually gave rise to the plaintiff's injuries.2'
Merryweather prohibited contribution 22 and thus kept a culpable
party from shifting part of the burden to other culpable
tortfeasors.23 But indemnity, which permitted a complete shifting
17. 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
18. Id. at 186, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337. There is some question as to whether Mer-
ryweather actually stood for the proposition that there was no contribution among negli-
gent tortfeasors. Merryweather involved intentional conduct, not negligence. However,
the majority of American courts, including those in Illinois, extended the rule against
contribution to include negligent tortfeasors. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 306; see
Wanack v. Michaels, 215 Ill. 87, 94-95, 74 N.E. 84, 87 (1905) (dictum); Michael & Appel,
Contribution and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois.- A Need for Reform, 7
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 591, 591-92 (1976).
19. See Merryweather, 8 T.R. at 186, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337; Heinrich v. Peabody
Int'l Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344, 349, 459 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1984). The facts that must be
established to sustain the cause of action and the assignment of the ultimate liability are
different for contribution and indemnity. Id.
Authorities encouraging adoption of contribution also have recognized that contribu-
tion and indemnity are distinct remedies. The Uniform Contribution Act specifically
preserved the right to indemnity:
This Act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. Where one
tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of indemnity obligee
is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled
to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT § 1(f) (1955). The 1976 Illinois Judi-
cial Conference recommended both the adoption of contribution and the retention of
some forms of implied indemnity. REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
1976, at 198 (1976). See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
20. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 310.
21. Gulf. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 152-
54, 98 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1st Dist. 1951). The right to indemnity may arise from either
an express indemnity contract or an implied indemnity contract. Davis v. FMC Corp.,
537 F. Supp. 466, 467 (C.D. I11. 1982). In this note only the status of implied indemnity
will be considered. For a discussion of express contractual indemnity, see J. DOOLEY, I
MODERN TORT LAW § 26.05 (1982); Kissell, Developments in Third Party Practice Con-
tribution and Indemnity, Part 1, 71 ILL. B.J. 654, 654-57 (1983).
22. Merryweather, 8 T.R. at 186, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
23. See John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 I11. 331, 339, 141
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of the burden from a nonculpable to a culpable defendant,24 sur-
vived the Merryweather decision."
Prior to the adoption of contribution, Illinois had adopted not
only the original form of implied contractual indemnity mentioned
in Merryweather,26 but several other forms as well.27 The original
implied contractual indemnity permitted indemnity in situations
where one tortfeasor caused the injury but another party was ex-
posed to vicarious or technical liability because of his relationship
to the tortfeasor. 2s Two elements were necessary to establish a
cause of action for implied indemnity: a pre-tort relationship be-
tween the defendants sufficient to support the concept of an im-
plied contract, 29 and circumstances that demonstrated a duty to
indemnify under the implied contract.3" Pre-tort relationships
which sometimes gave rise to a duty to indemnify included princi-
pal-agent, employer-employee, lessor-lessee, contractor-subcon-
tractor, and master-servant. 31 A duty to indemnify was found in
N.E. 739, 742 (1923) ("The general rule is that where two parties acting together commit
an illegal or wrongful act the party injured may hold both responsible for the damages
resulting from their joint act and neither can recover from the other the damages he may
have paid or any part of them.")
24. See Heinrich v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344, 349, 459 N.E.2d 935, 938
(1984).
25. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 152-
54, 98 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1st Dist. 1951) (lists viable implied indemnity claims in
Illinois).
26. Merryweather, 8 T.R. at 186, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
27. See infra notes 28-53 and accompanying text. For detailed discussions of the
history of indemnity in Illinois, see Feirich, Third-Party Practice, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 236,
236-37, 239-45 (1967); Ferrini, The Evolution from Indemnity to Contribution-A Ques-
tion of the Future, If Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI. B. REC. 254, 254-57 (1978); Michael &
Appel, supra note 18, at 591-616.
28. See John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 339, 141
N.E. 739, 742 (1923), wherein the court announced the general principle that where one
tortfeasor performs an act which produces injury and another party, who did not join in
the act, is exposed to liability for the injury, the law will inquire into the real delinquency
and place the ultimate liability upon the tortfeasor whose act caused the injury.
29. See Davis v. FMC Corp., 537 F. Supp. 466, 467 (C.D. Ill. 1982) ("Implied indem-
nity traditionally requires a pre-tort relationship which gives rise to a duty to indem-
nify."); Pryzbylski v. Perkins & Will Architects, 95 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623, 420 N.E.2d
524, 527 (1st Dist. 1981) (when implied indemnity is appropriate, the more culpable
wrongdoer would be unjustly enriched if the less culpable party could not obtain indem-
nity); see also S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, 1 LAW OF TORTS § 3:26 (1983)
(indemnity traditionally arises from contract, express or implied).
30. See Nelson v. Cook, 17 I11. 443, 448-49 (1856) (an employee or an agent may have
an implied promise of indemnity if directed to do an act that he does not know is wrong).
31. See, e.g., Id. (principal-agent); Mierzejwski v. Stronczek, 100 I11. App. 2d 68, 241
N.E.2d 573 (1st Dist. 1968) (lessor-lessee); Palier v. New City Iron Works, 81 111. App.
2d 1, 225 N.E.2d 67 (1st Dist. 1967) (employer-employee); Chas. Indus. Co. v. Cecil B.
Wood, Inc., 56 I11, App. 2d 30, 205 N.E.2d 786 (2d Dist. 1965) (contractor-subcontrac-
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situations where the one seeking indemnity incurred liability at the
direction of, in reliance upon, and in the interest of the one sought
to be charged,3 2 or the one seeking indemnity incurred liability be-
cause of a breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be
charged. 3a In all of these cases, indemnity was granted only when
the party seeking indemnity was without fault and was subject to
mere vicarious or technical liability for the unauthorized and
wrongful conduct of another.34
A qualitative difference in the fault of joint tortfeasors and a pre-
tort relationship between them also supported a claim for implied
indemnity. 35 The difference in fault could be either a qualitative
tor); Embree v. DeKalb Forge Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 85, 199 N.E.2d 250 (2d Dist. 1964)
(employer-employee); Rovecamp v. Cent. Constr. Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 441, 195 N.E.2d
756 (1st Dist. 1964) (contractor-subcontractor); Blaszak v. Union Tank Car Co., 37 Ill.
App. 2d 12, 184 N.E.2d 808 (1st Dist. 1962) (lessor-lessee); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v.
Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1st Dist. 1951) (master-
servant).
32. See Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443, 448-49 (1856); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 90 (1937).
33. See Chicago Rys. v. R.F. Conway Co., 219 Ill. App. 220 (1st Dist. 1920); RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 98 (1937).
34. See Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443, 448-49 (1856); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 96 (1937). The Illinois criteria for granting implied indemnity when the person seeking
it is without fault are similar to those in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B
(1977):
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors. (1) If two persons are liable in tort to a
third person for the same harm and one of them discharges the liability of both,
he is entitled to indemnity from the other if the other would be unjustly en-
riched at his expense by the discharge of the liability.
(2) Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the
following:
(a) The indemnitee was liable only vicariously for the conduct of the
indemnitor;
(b) The indemnitee acted pursuant to directions of the indemnitor and rea-
sonably believed the directions to be lawful;
(c) The indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresentation on the part
of the indemnitor, upon which he justifiably relied;
(d) The indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed defective
work upon land or buildings as a result of which both were liable to the
third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to dis-
cover the defect;
(e) The indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a
result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee
innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect;
(f) The indemnitor was under a duty to the indemnitee to protect him
against the liability to the third person.
In the remainder of this note, the criteria for implied indemnity actions discussed here
will be cumulatively referred to as "vicarious or technical implied indemnity."
35. See Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc., 59 Ill. 2d 445, 449, 322 N.E.2d 58, 60
(1974) (a tortfeasor may seek indemnity from a joint tortfeasor if there exists a qualitative
distinction between the negligence of the two tortfeasors); Tiffiny Decorating Co. v. Gen.
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difference in negligence, i.e., one tortfeasor was actively negligent
while the other was passively negligent ("active-passive" indem-
nity)36 or a difference in fault in a situation involving a safety stat-
ute, i.e., one tortfeasor's liability was mandated by the statute while
the conduct of the second tortfeasor actually caused the injury.37
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 12 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602, 299 N.E.2d 378, 381 (1st
Dist. 1973) (indemnity based upon an implied contract is separate and apart from indem-
nity arising out of difference between active and passive negligence). The requirement of
a pre-tort relationship for this type of implied indemnity claim has been the subject of
much debate. Prior to the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39
I11. 2d 226, 231-32, 234 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1968), the Illinois Appellate Court had permit-
ted such claims without a pre-tort relationship. See Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc.,
86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1967); Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51
I11. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1st Dist. 1964). The supreme court rejected this posi-
tion and enunciated the pre-tort relationship requirement in Muhlbauer, 39 Ill. 2d at 231-
32, 234 N.E.2d at 793. Several commentators subsequently argued that Muhlbauer did
not support the pre-tort relationship requirement. See Kissel, supra note 21, at 665;
Michael & Appel, supra note 18, at 607-13. The commentators argue that the court's
statement that a complaint for indemnification must disclose a relationship or circum-
stances that would give rise to a duty to indemnify should not be interpreted as requiring
a pre-tort relationship between the tortfeasors because in Muhlbauer, the party seeking
indemnity pleaded a defense rather than a right to indemnification. Michael & Appel,
supra note 18, at 609-10. However, the supreme court has not accepted these arguments
and continues to dismiss "active-passive" indemnity claims if there is no pre-tort relation-
ship. Van Slambrouck v. Economy Baler Co., 105 I11. 2d 462, 470, 475 N.E.2d 867, 871
(1985).
36. See John Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 I11. 331, 339, 141
N.E. 739, 742 (1923). The phrase "active-passive" can be used to characterize the rela-
tive fault between joint tortfeasors when there is a qualitative difference in the negligence
of the tortfeasors, or when one tortfeasor caused the injury and the other was only techni-
cally or vicariously liable. In this note, the phrase "active-passive" is limited to situations
where both tortfeasors are negligent.
37. See Miller v. Dewitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 291, 226 N.E.2d 630, 642 (1967). In Miller,
the supreme court used active-passive analysis even though the tortfeasors in the case
both were potentially liable under the Structural Work Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, J
60-69 (1983). The Act is a safety statute designed to prevent injury to persons employed
in the extra-hazardous occupation of structural work. Norton v. Wilbur Waggoner Co.,
76 I11. 2d 481, 489, 394 N.E.2d 403, 407 (1979) (citing Larson v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 33 I1l. 2d 316, 321-22, 211 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1965)). It imposes liability on persons
"having charge of' work covered by the Act who willfully violate the Act's provisions.
Structural Work Act § 9, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 69 (1983). Thus, a person who is
merely supervising a large project may be held liable along with the person actually re-
sponsible for the violation which results in some injury. Miller, 37 Ill. 2d at 291-92, 226
N.E.2d at 642.
The Miller court held that in this situation, it was more equitable to hold liable the
person actually responsible for the violation. Id. A party whose only liability was statu-
tory was considered passively liable and could obtain indemnity from the active wrong-
doer whose violation actually caused the injury. Id.
In Simmons v. Union Electric, 104 Iil. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946 (1984), the supreme
court followed Miller but noted that the active-passive indemnity might have been extin-
guished by the Contribution Act. Simmons, 104 Ill. 2d at 453, 473 N.E.2d at 950. Since
neither party was willing to raise and brief this question, the court proceeded to analyze
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Active-passive indemnity created the difficult problem of weighing
degrees of negligence.38 A lack of uniformity in the application of
"active-passive" indemnity produced inconsistent decisions.39 Fur-
thermore, while "active-passive" indemnity was supposed to allevi-
ate the harsh effects of the prohibition against contribution' this
indemnity itself proved to be inequitable in that it allowed a negli-
gent party, who participated in the wrongdoing, to shift the entire
liability to another.'
Equitable apportionment sometimes provided partial indemnity
independent of either an implied contractual or an active-passive
negligence basis, in situations where a tortfeasor was legally re-
sponsible for the reasonably foreseeable subsequent tortious acts of
others.42 To obtain equitable apportionment43 a tortfeasor had to
demonstrate that the plaintiff had suffered a subsequent injury
which was separate and distinct from the injury caused by the
the indemnity claim in terms of active-passive relationships. Id. at 454, 473 N.E.2d at
950.
38. The point at which negligence changes from active to passive is rather nebulous.
Wheeler v. Ellison, 124 Ill. App. 3d 852, 857, 464 N.E.2d 857, 861 (2d Dist. 1984)
("What constitutes active negligence so as to preclude the shifting of liability between
joint tortfeasors is not susceptible of precise definition and depends upon the facts of a
particular case.") (citing Moody v. Chicago Transit Auth., 17 Ill. App. 3d 113, 117, 307
N.E.2d 789, 792-93 (1st Dist. 1974)). See Bua, Third Party Practice in Illinois.- Express
and Implied Indemnity, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 287, 300-07 (1976). In Moody, the court
discussed the meaning of active and passive:
These words are terms of art and they must be applied in accordance with
concepts worked out by the courts of review upon a case by case basis. Under
appropriate circumstances, inaction or passivity in the ordinary sense may well
constitute the primary cause of a mishap or active negligence. . . . It has been
appropriately stated that "mere motion does not define the distinction between
active and passive negligence."
17 Ill. App. 3d at 117, 307 N.E.2d at 792-93.
39. Skinner, 70 I11. 2d at 12, 374 N.E.2d at 441 (application of active-passive indem-
nity where there is some fault attributable to both parties produces harsh effects without
uniformity of results).
40. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
41. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 12, 374 N.E.2d at 441.
42. See Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). In Gertz, improper
treatment of a knee injury resulted in amputation of the plaintiff's leg. Id. at 86, 302
N.E.2d at 42. An automobile driver who hit the plaintiff was liable for the improper
treatment under the principle that a tortfeasor is liable for subsequent injuries proxi-
mately caused by the original tortious act. Id. at 88, 302 N.E.2d at 43. The driver sought
indemnity not for the full amount of the damages, but only for the damages directly
attributable to the aggravation of the original injury. Id. at 86, 302 N.E.2d at 42. The
court reasoned that equity required granting equitable apportionment in this situation.
Id. at 89-92, 302 N.E.2d at 44-45.
43. Equitable apportionment is sometimes called equitable indemnity or partial in-
demnity. See, e.g., S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, I LAW OF TORTS § 3.28 (1983);
REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1976, at 214-16 (1976).
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 17
party seeking apportionment. 44 If he made the necessary showing,
the tortfeasor was indemnified for any injuries attributable to the
subsequent tortfeasor.45 Since both tortfeasors in such situations
were actively at fault, equitable apportionment applied where tra-
ditionally both implied indemnity and contribution had been
denied.46
Finally even an actively negligent tortfeasor could bring an im-
plied indemnity claim based upon products liability against the
manufacturer of a defective product that had injured the plaintiff.4 7
Such a manufacturer could fortuitously escape liability if the in-
jured party chose to sue a party "downstream" 48 from the manu-
facturer unless the party downstream was permitted indem-
nification from the manufacturer for damages awarded to the
plaintiff.49 Implied indemnity claims based upon upstream prod-
ucts liability"° thus furthered the goal of products liability5' by
44. Neuman v. City of Chicago, 110 I11. App. 3d 907, 911, 443 N.E.2d 626, 630 (1st
Dist. 1982). This requirement circumvented the rule against contribution among joint
tortfeasors. For causes of action which arose prior to March 1, 1978, the accepted defini-
tion of joint tortfeasors was based upon the concept of a single indivisible injury. See
supra note 3. Since the injuries in an equitable apportionment action were separate and
distinct, the parties were not joint tortfeasors. Neuman, 110 I11. App. 3d at 911, 443
N.E.2d at 629. The following facts had to be proved to sustain a cause of action for
equitable indemnity: (1) The original tortfeasor was liable at law for the subsequent neg-
ligence of the other; (2) the parties were not joint tortfeasors; (3) they did not act in
concert; (4) the injuries were sustained at different times; and (5) the original tortfeasor
lacked control over the acts of the subsequent tortfeasor. Id.
45. See, e.g., Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 90-92, 302 N.E.2d 40, 44 (1973).
46. Id. at 94, 302 N.E.2d at 46. (Underwood, J., concurring) (apportionment sought
is not cognizible under the Illinois approach to indemnification).
47. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 85, 338
N.E.2d 857, 861 (1975) (proof of an indemnitee's negligence will not bar a strict liability
claim).
48. The terms "upstream" and "downstream" often are used in discussing implied
indemnity claims based upon products liability. An "upstream" claim is one in which a
seller, distributor, or a party in a similar position seeks indemnity from the manufacturer
or other party further up the stream of commerce from the injured party. See Lowe v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 97-98, 463 N.E.2d 792, 805 (5th Dist. 1984). A
"downstream" claim is one in which a manufacturer or similarly situated party seeks
indemnity from a party down the stream of commerce, i.e., a party in a closer relation-
ship with the injured party. See Gunderson v. Goodall Rubber Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 748,
751, 458 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (1st Dist. 1983) (Jiganti, J., dissenting), af'd sub nom. Van
Slambrouck v. Economy Baler Co., 105 Ill. 2d 462, 475 N.E.2d 867 (1985).
49. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338
N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975) (citing L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 16A(4)(b)(i)).
50. See supra note 48.
51. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338
N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975) (citing L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
§ 16A(4)(b)(i)).
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placing loss caused by a defective product on the manufacturer
who placed the product in the stream of commerce.12 Such claims,
however, were permitted only if the party seeking indemnity did
not misuse the product or assume the risk of using the product.53
Thus, the concept of implied indemnity was used historically to
achieve the goal of products liability 54 and to alleviate the harsh
consequences of Illinois' rule against contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 5  Ultimately, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted
contribution. 6
Contribution in Illinois
In a 1977 case, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Ma-
chinery Co., 17 the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the common-
law rule that prohibited contribution among joint tortfeasors 5 8
The supreme court recognized that "active-passive" indemnity had
been used to mitigate the harsh results of the rule.59 However, the
court also recognized that when there was fault attributable to
more than one tortfeasor, the application of "active-passive" in-
demnity had itself produced some harsh results since indemnity
required the active wrongdoer to compensate the injured party not
only for the portion of the injury attributable to the active wrong-
doer's negligence but also for the portion of the injury caused by
52. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338
N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975). The negligence of a party seeking upstream implied indemnity
based upon products liability does not bar the action. Simpson v. General Motors Corp.,
108 Ill. 2d 146, 152, 483 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1985) (contributory negligence is not a factor in
products liability); Liberty, 62 Ill. 2d at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860 (purpose of strict liability is
best served by eliminating negligence as an element of a strict liability action); see supra
note 47 and accompanying text. However, misuse of a product, or assumption of the risk
in using a product, is a bar to an upstream implied indemnity claim based upon products
liability. Liberty, 62 Il1. 2d at 83, 338 N.E.2d at 860.
53. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 83, 338
N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975).
54. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
55. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 6-12, 374 N.E.2d
437, 439-42 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div.
Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978). See supra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
57. 70 111. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v.
Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
58. Id. at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443. In Skinner, the plaintiff filed a products liability
claim against a machine manufacturer for injuries suffered as a result of a machine mal-
function. Id. at 4, 374 N.E.2d at 438. The manufacturer filed a third-party complaint
against the plaintiff's employer. Id. The manufacturer argued that the employer should
be held liable in the amount that would be commensurate with the degree to which the
employer's misconduct contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 5, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
59. Id. at 12, 374 N.E.2d at 441.
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the passive wrongdoer.6° The court concluded that there was no
valid reason for the continued existence of the no-contribution
rule,6" but it failed to consider the status of implied indemnity after
the adoption of contribution.62
Following the court's lead, the Illinois General Assembly en-
acted the Contribution Act in 1981.63 This statute provides that a
right of contribution exists where two or more persons are subject
60. Id. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
61. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 13, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
62. Id. at 38-39, 374 N.E.2d at 454 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301-05 (1983). The Act provides in relevant part as
follows:
2. Right of Contribution. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act,
where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same
injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death, there is a right of
contribution among them, even though judgment has not been entered against
any or all of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is
limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor
is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common
liability.
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given
in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury
or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it
reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the considera-
tion actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is
discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
(e) A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not
entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not
extinguished by the settlement.
3. Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be
determined in accordance with his relative culpability. However, no person
shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater
than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one or more of the joint
tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share
the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro
rata liability. If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall
constitute a single share.
4. Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. A plaintiff's right to recover the full
amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liaiblity in
tort for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not
affected by the provisions of this Act.
5. Enforcement. A cause of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors
may be asserted by a separate action before or after payment, by counterclaim
or by third-party complaint in a pending action.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302-05 (1983).
For detailed discussions of the Contribution Act, see Horan, Contribution in Illinois:
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice and Senate Bill 308, 61 CM. B. REC. 331 (1980); O'Leary, Good
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to liability in tort arising out of the same injury and one has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability.64 The pro
rata share of each tortfeasor is determined in accordance with his
relative culpability. 65 The statute protects tortfeasors that settle in
good faith with the plaintiff against further suits for contribution.66
The Contribution Act provides relief in several circumstances
where implied indemnity historically had been the sole remedy.
For example, contribution has been allowed in active-passive negli-
gence67 situations68 and in situations in which the liability of one
defendant is based on the special duties of a safety statute. 69 Addi-
tionally, a party held liable to a plaintiff-employee is no longer re-
stricted to an indemnity remedy7" but may now seek contribution
from the plaintiff's employer.7
Faith Settlement and Release Agreements Under the Illinois Contribution Act, 73 ILL. B.J.
82 (1984).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(b) (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of this
provision.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 303 (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of this
provision.
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(d) (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of this
provision.
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
68. See Roberts v. Heilgeist, 124 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1087, 465 N.E.2d 658, 662 (2d
Dist. 1984) (contribution allowed where cotortfeasors are concurrent or successive as
long as the same injury is involved); Morgan v. Kirk Bros., Inc., III Ill. App. 3d 914,
919, 444 N.E.2d 504, 508 (2d Dist. 1982) (contribution not prevented by fact that
tortfeasors were subject to a common liability resting on different theories rather than on
a common standard of wrongdoing).
69. See Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 461 N.E.2d 382, 390 (1984). The Contri-
bution Act envisions two culpable defendants sharing liability even when the liability of
one is based on the special duties of a safety statute and does not depend on a theory of
negligence. Id. Thus, contribution actions are appropriate even if the tortfeasor seeking
contribution is liable under statutes such as the Structural Work Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, 60-69 (1983), or the Dram Shop Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, T 135 (1983).
See Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Il. App. 3d 607, 611, 479 N.E.2d 333, 336-37 (5th Dist.
1985) (contribution, not implied indemnity, appropriate in Structural Work Act case);
Monsen v. DeGroot, 130 Ill. App. 3d 735, 475 N.E.2d 5 (1st Dist. 1985) (contribution
permitted under the Dram Shop Act); Morgan v. Kirk Bros., Inc., 1 1111. App. 3d 914,
444 N.E.2d 504 (2d Dist. 1982) (contribution permitted under the Dram Shop Act). See
generally Note, Should Contribution Among Tortfeasors Be Permitted in Actions Arising
Under the Illinois Dram Shop Act?, 14 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 503 (1983). Implied indemnity
claims had been permitted in Structural Work Act cases, see supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text, but not in Dram Shop Act cases. See, e.g., Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc.,
54 I1. 2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718 (1973) (dram shop defendants not permitted to seek in-
demnity from the drinker).
70. See Miller v. Dewitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 289, 226 N.E.2d 630, 640-41 (1967) (allowing
indemnity on theory that unless a third party, who was not guilty of active negligence,
could succeed in an action against an employer who was guilty of active negligence, the
third party would bear the burden of a loss that should fall on the employer).
71. See Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 461 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1984). Contribution
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The relationship between implied indemnity and contribution re-
mains uncertain. Neither the Skinner decision nor the Contribu-
tion Act considered the status of implied indemnity after the
adoption of contribution,72 and the Illinois Appellate Court cases
are in conflict.73
THE APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
Van Jacobs v. ParikL Indemnity After
the Adoption of Contribution
The first appellate court decision that took a position on the vi-
tality of implied indemnity after the adoption of contribution was
Van Jacobs v. Parikh.74 In Van Jacobs, the widow of a motorcycle
rider who died as a result of a collision with an automobile brought
a wrongful death action against the driver of the automobile and
the manufacturer of the helmet worn by the decedent at the time of
the accident.75 The widow settled with the driver for the amount
provided by his insurance policy and executed a covenant not to
sue.76 The manufacturer then filed a three-count third-party com-
plaint against the driver seeking equitable apportionment,77 contri-
bution7" and implied indemnity.7 9
The appellate court held that implied indemnity had not been
nullified by the Contribution Act8 0 but had, rather, been placed
back upon its theoretical foundation."' The court held that a cause
is available even though the workers' compensation statute protects the employer from
being sued directly by its employee for damages associated with an on-the-job injury. Id.
For a survey of various states' policies on the interaction of workers' compensation stat-
utes, contribution and indemnity, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 350 (1980).
72. See supra notes 62-63 and acompanying text.
73. See infra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
74. 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1st Dist. 1981).
75. Id. at 611, 422 N.E.2d at 980.
76. Id.
77. Id. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. The court upheld dismissal of
the claim for equitable apportionment, holding that since the Contribution Act applied to
tortfeasors subject to liability for the same injury, this claim was actually for contribution
and thus barred by the good faith settlement. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 614, 422
N.E.2d at 982. See supra note 66 and infra notes 82, 136 and accompanying text.
78. Van'Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 611, 422 N.E.2d at 980. The court upheld dismis-
sal of the contribution count because the driver had settled and was shielded from any
contribution claim by the Contribution Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(d) (1983),
which provides that for tortfeasors subject to its provisions, good faith settlements will
discharge the settling parties' liabilities for contribution. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at
612, 422 N.E.2d at 980-81.
79. Id. at 611, 422 N.E.2d at 980. See infra note 82.
80. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981.
81. Id.
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of action for implied indemnity requires both a qualitative distinc-
tion between the conduct of joint tortfeasors and a duty to indem-
nify arising not from the relative fault of the tortfeasors but from
the pre-tort relationship between the tortfeasors s2
The Van Jacobs court characterized active-passive negligence in-
demnity as a creative expansion of implied indemnity beyond its
traditional precepts, implemented to lessen the harshness of the no-
contribution rule.83 Since the Contribution Act accomplished this
same purpose, the court found no further need for "active-passive"
indemnity.84
In interpreting the Van Jacobs court's holding that implied in-
82. Id. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. The court upheld dismissal of
the claim for indemnity because there was no pre-tort relationship between the manufac-
turer and the driver. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 982.
83. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981.
84. Id. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. Other states with contribution
statutes also have limited implied indemnity to claims based upon vicarious or technical
liability. For example, Minnesota's contribution statute, MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1984),
like Illinois' statute, does not mention the status of indemnity. Minnesota's common law
implied indemnity was very similar to that of Illinois:
A joint tortfeasor may generally recover indemnity only in the following situa-
tions:
(1) Where the one seeking indemnity has only a derivative or vicarious liabil-
ity for damage caused by the one sought to be charged.
(2) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability by action at the
direction, in the interest of, and in reliance upon the one sought to be charged.
(3) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability because of a
breach of duty owed to him by the one sought to be charged.
(4) Where the one seeking indemnity has incurred liability merely because of
failure, even though negligent, to discover or prevent the misconduct of the one
sought to be charged.
(5) Where there is an express contract between the parties containing an
explicit undertaking to reimburse for liability of the character involved.
Hendrickson v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 372, 104 N.W.2d 843, 848
(1960), overruled in part, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977).
See supra notes 17-41 and accompanying text. In Tolbert, "active-passive" indemnity
was eliminated, but the other common-law implied indemnity actions, including implied
indemnity based upon a pre-tort relationship and technical or vicarious liability, survived
contribution. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 284 N.W.2d 180,
184 (Minn. 1979).
Several other states have reached similar conclusions even though their contribution
statutes specifically preserve all rights to indemnity. See, e.g., Houdaille Indus., Inc. v.
Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493 (Fla. 1979) (weighing degrees of negligence "has no place
in the concept of indemnity for the one seeking indemnity must be without fault"); Rath-
bun v. W. Mass. Elec. Co., 395 Mass. 361, 479 N.E.2d 1383, 1385 n.4 (1985) (adjustment
of common law indemnity principles to transfer all the loss to the more negligent of two
tortfeasors would intrude on the apportionment rule of the contribution statute); Cartel
Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 566, 410 A.2d 674, 683 (1980) (it would be
inequitable to permit an active wrongdoer to obtain implied indemnity from another
wrongdoer and thus escape any responsibility). See generally 2 COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE § 13.80 (MB 1984) (surveying state treatment of indemnity).
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demnity claims based upon a qualitative distinction in the conduct
of the parties and a pre-tort relationship survived the Contribution
Act,8 5 appellate court panels have reached different conclusions.
One panel has interpreted Van Jacobs as preserving implied indem-
nity only for cases involving a pre-tort relationship and vicarious
liability,86 while another panel has stated that according to Van
Jacobs the Contribution Act did not alter the right to implied in-
demnity in any way.87
Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Railway: Indemnity and Products
Liability After the Adoption of Contribution
The Illinois Appellate Court also has preserved implied indem-
nity in a products liability action. In Lowe v. Norfolk & Western
Railway,8 a tank car being transported by Norfolk & Western
Railway Company ("N&W") was punctured by its own running
gear, causing the release of an allegedly hazardous chemical.89 The
plaintiffs, forty-seven employees of N&W who were exposed to the
chemical, sued N&W for negligence. 90 They also filed products lia-
bility complaints against the manufacturer of the tank car, the
manufacturer of a portion of the tank car's running gear, and the
manufacturer of the chemical.9" N&W filed counterclaims for con-
85. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981. The court relied upon
Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 231-32, 234 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1968), for the proposi-
tion that a pre-tort relationship must be demonstrated to sustain a claim for implied
indemnity. Van Jacobs, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 613, 422 N.E.2d at 981. See supra note 35.
The argument has been raised that Muhlbauer does not support this claim. See supra
note 35. However, this requirement can be supported by statutory interpretation, in-
dependent of Muhlbauer. See infra notes 148-75 and accompanying text.
86. Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 Ill. App. 3d 767, 774, 469 N.E.2d 653, 658 (1st Dist.
1984). On appeal a party from whom the defendant sought implied indemnity argued
specifically that the Contribution Act had replaced "active-passive" indemnity. Id. at
770, 469 N.E.2d at 655. The court agreed and held that the Contribution Act extin-
guished implied indemnity in Illinois except where a pre-tort relationship between the
parties created a duty to indemnify, or where the indemnity action was based upon up-
stream strict liability. Id. at 774, 469 N.E.2d at 658. See infra notes 109-16 and accom-
panying text.
87. Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Ill. App. 3d 607, 610, 479 N.E.2d 333, 335-36 (5th
Dist. 1985). Van Jacobs was interpreted to state that the Contribution Act did not alter
the right to indemnity in any respect, see infra notes 109-16 and accompanying text, but
the Allison court pointed out that neither a pre-tort relationship which gave rise to a duty
to indemnify nor strict liability was involved in the instant case because the case arose
under the Structural Work Act. Id. at 610-11, 479 N.E.2d at 335-36. See supra note 37.
The court held that the best policy in Structural Work Act cases was to allow contribu-
tion rather than indemnity. Allison, 133 I11. App. 3d at 611, 479 N.E.2d at 337.
88. 124 111. App. 3d 80, 463 N.E.2d 792 (5th Dist. 1984).
89. Id. at 84-85, 463 N.E.2d at 797.
90. Id. at 85, 463 N.E.2d at 797.
91. Id. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of the tank car and the manufacturer of a
Implied Indemnity
tribution and indemnity against each of the other defendants.92
All of the counterdefendants to N&W's claims argued that the
Contribution Act had abolished implied indemnity. 93 The court
noted that the policies underlying contribution and products liabil-
ity were different: contribution encouraged settlements while
products liability imposed liability for injuries caused by a defec-
tive product on the one who placed the defective product into the
stream of commerce.94 The court held that since it was more im-
portant to protect the public from defective products by holding
manufacturers strictly liable than to encourage settlements, the
Contribution Act did not prohibit N&W's implied indemnity
counterclaims based upon products liability. 95
All of the defendants except N&W settled with the plaintiffs
before trial.96 Since the Contribution Act protects parties that set-
tle in good faith against suits for contribution,97 the defendants to
N&W's counterclaims moved for dismissal of all counterclaims in-
cluding the implied indemnity counterclaims. 98  The court held
that a good faith settlement under the Contribution Act does not
bar an implied indemnity claim based upon products liability.99
According to the court, if a manufacturer of a defective product
could escape indemnity liability by making a contribution settle-
ment, the policy of placing the liability for injuries on the one who
placed a defective product in the stream of commerce would be
frustrated because the manufacturer's contribution settlement
portion of the tank car's running gear on a products liability theory, and the chemical
manufacturer for negligence and willful and wanton misconduct in addition to products
liability. Id.
92. Id. at 90, 463 N.E.2d at 801. There were six counts, two against each of the other
defendants; each count sought contribution and implied indemnity. One count against
each defendant alleged strict liability; the other alleged negligence. Id. at 92-93, 463
N.E.2d at 802. Thus, the court had to consider contribution claims based upon negli-
gence and strict liability, and implied indemnity claims based upon negligence and strict
liability. Id. at 93, 463 N.E.2d at 802.
93. Id. at 93, 463 N.E.2d at 802.
94. Id. at 97, 463 N.E.2d at 805.
95. Id. at 98, 463 N.E.2d at 806. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
96. Lowe, 124 I11. App. 3d at 90-91, 463 N.E.2d at 801.
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(c), (d) (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of
these provisions.
98. Lowe, 124 I11. App. 3d at 91, 463 N.E.2d at 801. The court held that N&W's
contribution claims were barred under the good faith settlement provison of the Contri-
bution Act. Id. at 96, 463 N.E.2d at 804 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(c), (d)
(1983)). The court affirmed dismissal of the negligence counts, which were based on an
active-passive theory, not because they failed to state a cause of action, but because the
parties failed to brief them. Lowe, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 96, 463 N.E.2d at 804.
99. Id. at 98-99, 463 N.E.2d at 806.
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would shift any remaining liability for injuries caused by the defec-
tive product to the party seeking indemnification." °
Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co.: The Contribution Act Extinguished
All Implied Indemnity Claims
In Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co.,'" another panel of the Illinois
Appellate Court took a position which differed sharply from the
Van Jacobs and Lowe opinions. Holmes involved a mechanic who
brought an action to recover for personal injuries suffered while
repairing a coal-mining tractor for the mine's owner.10 2 The com-
plaint charged the owner with negligence and stated a products
liability claim against the manufacturer of the tractor. 103 The mine
owner filed a counterclaim for indemnity against the manufacturer
of the tractor, and the manufacturer sought contribution from the
mine owner."0
The court agreed with the manufacturer that the mine owner
had failed to state a cause of action because the Contribution Act
had extinguished common-law implied indemnity claims.0 I In-
demnity, the court stated, created a scheme in which the
tortfeasor's culpability bore no direct relation to his burden for the
loss, 1 6 whereas the Contribution Act determined a tortfeasor's
contribution share according to his relative culpability. 1 7 Thus,
indemnity, according to the court, would undermine the policy un-
derlying the right to contribution. 08
ANALYSIS
The Conflict in the Appellate Court
Various panels of the appellate court have reached different con-
clusions as to both the scope and the soundness of the Van Jacobs
court's conclusion that implied indemnity remains a viable cause of
action where there is a qualitative distinction in the conduct of the
parties and a pre-tort relationship.0 9 Panels considering Van Ja-
100. Id. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
101. 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 475 N.E.2d 1383 (5th Dist. 1985).
102. Id. at 669, 475 N.E.2d at 1385.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 676, 475 N.E.2d at 1390.
106. Id. See supra note 21 and infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
107. Holmes, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 676, 475 N.E.2d at 1390.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 85-87, 105 and accompanying text. The Illinois Supreme Court
has noted that the differences in appellate court decisions await resolution but has stead-
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cobs' scope have varied in their interpretation of Van Jacobs' re-
fastly refused to address the issue until it is briefed and argued at the appellate level. Van
Slambrouck v. Economy Baler Co., 105 Ill. 2d 462, 471, 475 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1985);
Simmons v. Union Elec. Co., 104 11. 2d 444, 453-54, 473 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1984);
Heinrich v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51, 459 N.E.2d 935, 938-39 (1984).
In Heinrich, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded the case to the appellate court for
determination of whether implied indemnity survived the adoption of contribution.
Heinrich, 99 Ill. 2d at 351, 459 N.E.2d at 939. As this note was going to press the appel-
late court issued a decision in Heinrich v. Peabody Int'l Corp., No. 81-1770 (Ill. App. Ct.,
1st Dist. Dec. 13, 1985). The appellate court held that the Contribution Act extinguished
all implied indemnity claims, Id. at 20, because contribution is an equitable remedy and
implied indemnity defeats the purposes of contribution. Id. at 10. In support of its con-
clusion, the court cited 1) Report of the Illinois Judicial Conference 1976, which urged the
adoption of contribution; Id. at 6; see supra note 19 and infra notes 173-75 and accompa-
nying text; 2) the inequities of "active-passive" implied indemnity, Heinrich, No. 81-1770,
slip op. at 5-9; see infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text; and 3) the argument that a
party has little or no incentive to make a contribution settlement if the party remains
liable for implied indemnity. Heinrich, No. 81-1770, slip op. at 13; see infra notes 135-46
and accompanying text.
The court failed to address the 1976 Judicial Conference recommendation that implied
indemnity be returned to its common-law status after the adoption of contribution. RE-
PORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1976, at 219 (1976); see infra notes 173-
75 and accompanying text. Also, the decision suggests that the problems associated with
",active-passive" implied indemnity are applicable to the original common-law bases for
implied indemnity. The decision does not explain why permitting an implied indemnity
claim is inequitable when a party is only technically or vicariously liable and there is a
pre-tort relationship with the actual wrondoer, nor does it explain why a technically or
vicariously liable party should share in the damages. Rather, the court argued that con-
tribution adequately protects such a party. Heinrich, No. 81-1770, slip op. at 15-16. The
contrary argument raised in Jethroe v. Koehring Co., 603 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (S.D. Ill.
1985) (in a contribution claim by a vicariously or technically liable party, that party
would, more likely than not, pay some portion of the damages because the jury would
assign a percentage based on damages rather than liability); see infra notes 121-46 and
accompanying text, was not addressed.
The Heinrich appellate court criticized the decision in Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill.
App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1st Dist. 1981); see supra notes 74-87 and infra notes 110-
16 and accompanying text, and in Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 463
N.E.2d 792 (5th Dist. 1984); see supra notes 88-100 and infra notes 138-39 and accompa-
nying text. Heinrich, No. 81-1770, slip op. at 15-17. The appellate court panel did not
challenge the holding of Van Jacobs directly, but instead challenged Van Jacobs' reliance
upon Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 11. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968), for a pre-tort relation-
ship; see supra note 35, and Van Jacobs' use of qualitative distinctions in conduct.
Heinrich, No. 81-1770, slip op. at 15-16; see supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
The criticism of the qualitative distinction in conduct of the tortfeasors is based upon the
problems that arise with "active-passive" implied indemnity. Heinrich, No. 8 1-1770, slip
op. at 15. Although the Heinrich court acknowledged that Van Jacobs held that "active-
passive" implied indemnity no longer exists, Id. at 14, it failed to recognize that a qualita-
tive distinction in conduct should be interpreted as supporting only implied indemnity
claims based upon vicarious or technical liability. See supra note 36 and infra notes 110-
16 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the court did not recognize that the require-
ment of a pre-tort relationship can be supported without reliance upon Muhlbauer. See
supra note 84 and infra notes 148-75 and accompanying text. The criticism of Muhlbauer
also ignores the Illinois Supreme Court's continued reliance upon the holding of that
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quirement of a qualitative distinction in conduct." °  Such a
distinction occurs not only when one tortfeasor is actively negli-
gent and the other passively negligent,"' but also when one party
is totally without fault but is vicariously or technically liable." 2
Since the Van Jacobs court explicitly held that active-passive
negligence indemnity"I3 was no longer needed after the adoption of
contribution," 4 the court's reference to a qualitative distinction in
conduct must refer to situations in which the party seeking indem-
nity is only vicariously or technically liable."' This interpretation
makes the Van Jacobs opinion internally consistent and contradicts
any contention that Van Jacobs held that the Contribution Act did
not alter the right to implied indemnity in any way." 6
The Holmes court denied the viability of indemnity not only
where the party seeking indemnity is vicariously or technically lia-
ble but also, as in Lowe," 7 where the indemnity claim is based
case. See, e.g., Van Slambrouck v. Economy Baler Co., 105 Ill. 2d 462, 470, 475 N.E.2d
867, 871 (1985); see supra note 35.
The Heinrich panel claimed that the Lowe court offered no justification for maintaining
implied indemnity based upon upstream products liability. Heinrich, No. 81-1770, slip
op. at 17. The Lowe court compared the policies of strict liability and contribution to
arrive at its decision, Lowe, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 98-99, 463 N.E.2d at 806; see supra notes
88-100 and infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text, but the Heinrich panel concluded
that the policies of strict liability are satisfied by not requiring the injured party to prove
privity or negligence, and by imposing joint and several liability upon the defendants in
the distributive chain. Heinrich, No. 81-1770, slip op. at 16-17. The Lowe court based its
analysis upon the direction provided by the Illinois Supreme Court in Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Lowe, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 97, 463
N.E.2d at 805; see supra notes 88-100 and infra notes 131-42 and accompanying text. In
Suvada, the court stated that the public policy consideration which motivated the adop-
tion of strict liability was that the economic loss suffered by the injured party should be
imposed on the manufacturer who created the risk and reaped the profit. Suvada, 32 Ill.
2d at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186. Since the Heinrich court focused upon the attributes of a
products liability claim rather than upon the public policy reason for the claim, the
court's rejection of implied indemnity claims based upon upstream products liability is
not well founded.
110. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
114. Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1st Dist.
1981). See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
115. See U.S. Home Corp. v. Kennedy Const. Co., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 85, 86 (N.D.
I11. 1984); Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 I11. App. 3d 767, 774, 469 N.E.2d 653, 658 (1st
Dist. 1984).
116. This was the interpretation of Van Jacobs in Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Ill.
App. 3d 607, 610, 479 N.E.2d 333, 335-36 (5th Dist. 1985). See supra note 87 and ac-
companying text.
117. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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upon upstream products liability."' The Holmes court held that
implied indemnity would defeat the equitable principles underlying
the Contribution Act by creating a scheme in which the
tortfeasor's culpability bore no direct relation to his share of the
burden for the plaintiff's loss. " 9 An analysis of public policy, how-
ever, demonstrates that implied indemnity is not inequitable when
it is based upon a combination of a pre-tort relationship and vicari-
ous or technical liability, or upon upstream products liability. 2 °
Retention of Indemnity in Limited Circumstances Assures
Equitable Results
Both contribution and indemnity are based upon the equitable
concept of unjust enrichment.1 2 1 The appellate court consistently
has held that a complete shifting of the liability from one tortfeasor
to another when both are negligent is no longer viable. 122 "Active-
passive" implied indemnity permits such a complete shifting even
though joint tortfeasors are both negligent.2 3 Thus, granting one
tortfeasor indemnity based on active-passive negligence considera-
tions would defeat the public policy of the Contribution Act favor-
ing apportionment of liability according to relative fault. 24
However, when a person liable to the injured party is without
fault, i.e., vicariously or technically liable, and the injury was
caused by another party, implied indemnity is equitable. It does
not destroy the assignment of liability in proportion to responsibil-
118. Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 676, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1390
(5th Dist. 1985). See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
119. Holmes, 131 I11. App. 3d at 676, 475 N.E.2d at 1390. See supra notes 105-08
and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text. One panel of the appellate court
has stated that implied indemnity survived the Contribution Act only in these two types
of situations. Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 I11. App. 3d 607, 609-11, 479 N.E.2d 333, 336
(5th Dist. 1985). See supra notes 87, 116 and accompanying text.
121. Leflar, supra note 3, at 136-37, 147.
122. Heinrich v. Peabody Int'l Corp., No. 81-1770, slip op. at 14 (II1. App. Ct., 1st
Dist. Dec. 13, 1985); Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Ill. App. 3d 607, 609-10, 479 N.E.2d
333, 335 (5th Dist. 1985); Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 I11. App. 3d 666, 676, 475
N.E.2d 1383, 1390 (5th Dist. 1985); Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 I11. App. 3d 767, 774, 469
N.E.2d 653, 658 (1st Dist. 1984); Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 I11. App. 3d 80, 97, 463
N.E.2d 792, 805 (5th Dist. 1984); Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 422
N.E.2d 979, 981 (1st Dist. 1981). See generally D. Gustman & R. Schreiber, Active-
Passive Implied Indemnity. The Current Status of this Obsolete Doctrine, 74 ILL. B.J. 252
(1986).
123. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 303 (1983). Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App.
3d 666, 676, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1390 (5th Dist. 1985). See generally Lawler, Contribution,
Indemnity and Settlements. A Conflict in Policy, 74 ILL. B.J. 74, 74-76, 80-82 (1985).
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ity for the tortious act since it permits the technically or vicari-
ously liable tortfeasor to place the liability on the tortfeasor who
performed the wrongful act. 125 The wrongdoer is not liable for any
damages other than those associated with the injuries his act
caused. 126
Comparison of the potential results of contribution and implied
indemnity when there is a pre-tort relationship between joint
tortfeasors and one of the tortfeasors is only vicariously or techni-
cally liable demonstrates that only implied indemnity assures an
equitable result. Consider the contractor who is not negligent in
any respect but who is held technically or vicariously liable for the
conduct of his negligent subcontractor. 127 If contribution were the
contractor's only remedy, the jury could apportion damages as it
saw fit even if it determined that the contractor was only techni-
cally liable. 128 The contractor in such a situation is more likely
than not to pay some portion of the damages.' 29 The subcontrac-
tor is unjustly enriched to the extent that the jury assesses damages
against the contractor. Thus, contribution can produce an inequi-
table result.
Implied indemnity, on the other hand, would prevent an inequi-
table result in this situation. If the contractor seeks implied indem-
nity, and the jury decides that he was not negligent but only
technically or vicariously liable, then as a matter of law the sub-
contractor alone will compensate the victim. 130 There is no possi-
bility that the subcontractor will be unjustly enriched. Each
tortfeasor is responsible only for the harm his act inflicted. Hence,
equitable assessment of tort liability does not support elimination
of this aspect of implied indemnity.
Similarly, implied indemnity based upon an upstream products
liability claim is equitable and does not defeat products liability
125. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Jethroe v. Koehring Co., 603 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (S.D. Ill. 1985). "In those
cases where a party is more than technically negligent, as where the employer has failed
to properly supervise the employee,. . . implied indemnity would no longer be an option
to the employer since his negligence has proceeded past the mere technical negligence."
Id.
128. Id. (in a claim for contribution, "once the jury determined that the employer
was vicariously liable, or the contractor technically liable .... it would be free to appor-
tion fault as it saw fit.").
129. Id. (in a contribution claim by a vicariously or technically liable party, that
party would, more likely than not, pay some portion of the damages because the jury
would assign a percentage based on damages rather than liability).
130. Id. ("IT]he Court believes that in the traditional implied indemnity situation,
the entire loss should be placed on the indemnitor as a matter of law.").
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policy. '3' Consider a distributor who is sued on a products liability
theory for injuries caused by a defective product. 32 Assume that
the distributor acts innocently and does not assume the risk or mis-
use the product. Allowing the distributor to seek implied indem-
nity from the manufacturer of the defective product will
accomplish the policy of products liability by placing the burden
for injuries caused by the defective product on the manufacturer
who placed the product in the stream of commerce. 33 Moreover,
implied indemnity will not require the manufacturer to pay more
than it would have paid had it been sued directly. Here again,
implied indemnity will not produce the inequity that the Holmes
court feared.' 34
Implied Indemnity and Settlements
While the continued vitality of implied indemnity in some cir-
cumstances is entirely consistent with equitable principles, it in-
volves a potential conflict with another policy consideration
underlying the Contribution Act. Public policy favors settlement
of tort claims. 135 The Contribution Act encourages settlement by
protecting a party that settles in good faith from liability for contri-
131. See supra note 100 and infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
132. See Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 206, 454 N.E.2d
210, 216 (1983) ("all persons in the distributive chain are liable for injuries resulting from
a defective product"). Although Illinois places the burden for a defective product on the
manufacturer, see supra note 94 and infra note 133 and accompanying texts, the seller is
held liable to help assure the injured plaintiff a source of recovery. V. WALKOWIAK, 1
UNIF. PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 12.02[3] (1980). This concept is codified in Ill. Code
of Civil Procedure § 2-621, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-621 (1983). Under this section,
a seller may be dismissed from a products liability action once the manufacturer of the
product is brought into the suit. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110, V 2-621(b) (1983). However, if
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the manufacturer no longer exists, is no longer able to
satisfy a judgment, or would be unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agree-
ment with the plaintiff, the seller will be brought back into the action. Id.
133. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 374
N.E.2d 437, 443 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice
Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978) (public policy consideration which moti-
vated the adoption of strict liability was that the economic loss suffered by the user
should be imposed on the manufacturer who created the risk and reaped the profit); a
similar conclusion was reached in Lawler, supra note 124, at 82. However, the author,
while noting some appellate court decisions, did not consider the contrary arguments
presented in Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 I11. App. 3d 666, 676, 475 N.E.2d 1383,
1390 (5th Dist. 1985).
134. Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 676, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1390
(5th Dist. 1985). See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
135. Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 98, 463 N.E.2d 792, 806 (5th
Dist. 1984).
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bution. 136 One commentator has argued that implied indemnity
should be included within the Contribution Act's settlement provi-
sion because a party who remains liable for implied indemnity after
settlement has no incentive to settle. 37 The encouragement of set-
tlements, however, must be balanced against other public policy
considerations.
In products liability actions, encouragement of settlement
should be subordinated to the more important policy of protecting
the public from defective products. 13 8 If the manufacturer of a de-
fective product can escape a portion of its potential liability by
making a settlement which will protect it from an implied indem-
nity action, then the products liability policy of placing the entire
liability for a defective product on the party who places it in the
stream of commerce will be frustrated. 139
As an example, consider a products liability action in which the
plaintiff sues both the seller, who is without fault,14° and the manu-
facturer to recover $5,000,000 in damages for injuries caused by a
defective product. The manufacturer settles in good faith with the
plaintiff for $500,000. If the Contribution Act bars the seller from
seeking indemnity from the manufacturer, the seller is faced with a
dilemma: he may settle, despite his lack of culpability, or he may
continue to defend the case with no hope of recouping anything
from the manufacturer. If the case continues and the plaintiff
prevails, the seller will have to pay the amount by which the judg-
ment exceeds $500,000. 1' In either of these situations, the manu-
facturer has successfully escaped part of the burden associated
with the injuries caused by the defective product which it pro-
duced. Therefore, the manufacturer by settling has circumvented
the policy underlying products liability.'42
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(c), (d) (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of
this provision.
137. See Note, Implied Indemnity After Skinner and the Illinois Contribution Act:
The Case for A Uniform Standard, 14 Loy. U. Cur. L.J. 531, 550 (1983).
138. Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 98, 463 N.E.2d 792, 806 (5th
Dist. 1984) ("Settlements are to be encouraged, but more importantly the public is to be
protected from defective products.").
139. Id. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. See Lawler, supra note 124,
at 82 (also concludes that the analysis in Lowe correctly resolves the public policy conflict
between products liability and the Contribution Act).
140. See Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 206, 454 N.E.2d
210, 216 (1983) (all persons in the distributive chain are liable for injuries resulting from
a defective product).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(c) (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of this
provision.
142. To prevent this result the seller must successfully challenge the good faith of the
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Allowing the seller to seek implied indemnity would prevent the
manufacturer from using a contribution settlement to force other
parties to pay part of the costs associated with an injury arising
from the defective product. With implied indemnity, a seller can
shift the entire liability for a defective product to the manufacturer.
This result upholds the public policy underlying products liability.
Similarly, in situations where a tortfeasor is only technically or
vicariously liable, contribution may encourage inequitable settle-
ments. 143 If the actual wrongdoer can take advantage of the settle-
ment provision of the Contribution Act, the vicariously or
technically liable party will be forced to absorb any damages in
excess of the amount of the wrongdoer's settlement. 144 Any pay-
ment by the technically or vicariously liable tortfeasor, however,
defeats the policy underlying contribution, which requires that the
wrongdoer compensate the injured party in proportion to the
wrongdoer's responsibility for the injuries.'4 5 Such a payment re-
sults in an inequitable distribution of the damages since the wrong-
doer is not held accountable for the complete consequences of his
own fault. Instead, the wrongdoer is unjustly enriched to the ex-
tent that the vicariously or technically liable party compensates the
injured party. An inequitable shifting of the liability among joint
tortfeasors was one of the reasons for replacing "active-passive"
implied indemnity with contribution. 146 If the vicariously or tech-
nically liable tortfeasor is denied an action for indemnity, contribu-
manufacturer's settlement. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, $ 302(d) (1983); see supra note 63 for
the text of this provision. Unless the seller can demonstrate tortious or wrongful conduct
on the part of the manufacturer in settling, he is not likely to prevail. Lowe v. Norfolk &
W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 96, 463 N.E.2d 792, 804 (5th Dist. 1984) ("With no evidence
of tortious or wrongful conduct, it does not appear that the settlements were lacking in
good faith.").
143. See Jethroe v. Koehring Co., 603 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (S.D. Ill. 1985) ("[If
contribution were the only option available to the technically negligent party the possibil-
ity of settlement would increase. The technically negligent party, apprehensive of the
jury's assigning him a percentage of fault, would be more willing to kick some money into
the pot available for the plaintiff.").
144. Id.
145. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 14, 374
N.E.2d 437, 443 (1977), cert. denied sub nor. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice
Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Batteast v. St. Bernard's Hosp., 134 Ill.
App. 3d 843, 853, 480 N.E.2d 1304, 1311 (1st Dist. 1985).
146. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 374 N.E.2d
437, 441 (1977) (application of active-passive indemnity where there is some fault attribu-
table to both parties produces harsh effects without uniformity of results), cert. denied sub
nor. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946
(1978).
1985]
Loyola University Law Journal
tion will have come full circle and will have contributed to the very
inequity it was designed to prevent.
Thus, some of the public policies underlying both the Contribu-
tion Act and products liability provide strong support for the con-
tinued vitality of implied indemnity in cases in which the party
seeking indemnity is only vicariously or technically liable or is
"downstream" from the manufacturer of a defective product.
Well-recognized principles of statutory construction also demon-
strate that the Contribution Act can coexist with implied indem-
nity in these two situations.I47
Statutory Construction of the Contribution Act
As shown by the conflicting opinions of the Illinois Appellate
Court,14 there is sufficient doubt as to the effect of the Contribu-
tion Act on implied indemnity to warrant reliance on traditional
principles of statutory construction. 49 The purpose of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and
meaning of the legislature. 5 ° Since the Contribution Act is silent
on implied indemnity,"' the courts must use extrinsic interpretive
aids, such as the legislative history, to determine the true intent
and meaning of the legislature.152
The published legislative history of the Contribution Act is not
extensive. ' One state senator noted that the contribution bill was
147. See infra notes 148-92 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 74-108 and accompanying text.
149. See City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 22 Ill. App. 3d 327, 329, 317 N.E.2d 356,
357 (5th Dist. 1974) ("before a court may employ rules of interpretation or construction
of statutes there must be an ambiguity or inconsistency" in the statute), rev'd on other
grounds, 61 Ill. 2d 483, 338 N.E.2d 19 (1975); Stice v. Beard, 46 Ill. App. 2d 304, 197
N.E.2d 102 (4th Dist. 1964) (before a statute is open to construction there must be ambi-
guity present).
150. Laue v. Leifheit, 105 Ill. 2d 191, 196, 473 N.E.2d 939, 941 (1984) (citing People
v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141, 445 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (1983)); Village of Schaumburg v.
Franberg, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 424 N.E.2d 1239, 1242 (1st Dist. 1981) (citing Brown v.
Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 89 Ill. App. 3d 238, 411 N.E.2d 882 (1st Dist. 1980)).
151. Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 Ill. App. 3d 767, 772, 469 N.E.2d 653, 656 (1st Dist.
1984) ("[T]he Contribution Act is silent with respect to the interplay between its intent
and the right to express or implied indemnity."). See supra note 63 for the text of rele-
vant provisions of the Act.
152. See Laue v. Leifheit, 105 Ill. 2d 191, 196, 473 N.E.2d 939, 941 (1984) (citing
People v. Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141, 445 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (1983)); Morizzo v.
Laverdure, 127 Ill. App. 2d 767, 773 n.2, 469 N.E.2d 653, 657 n.2 (1st Dist. 1984).
153. See 1 LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1979 SESS. OF THE 81ST
GEN. ASSEMBLY, 236-37 (1980); 81ST ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, TRANSCRIPT OF HOUSE
PROCEEDINGS, June 14, 1979 at 17-23 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE DEBATE]; 81ST ILL.
GEN. ASSEMBLY TRANSCRIPT OF SENATE PROCEEDINGS, May 14, 1979 at 173-76 [here-
inafter cited as SENATE DEBATE]; Chicago Bar Ass'n Civ. Prac. Comm'n, Legislative
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related to the Skinner decision, 154 and that the bill was intended to
ameliorate the harshness of the common-law rule against contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors."' A state representative stated that
the purposes of the contribution bill were to codify the Skinner
decision' 56 and to add provisions clarifying the rights of and be-
tween tortfeasors.'57 At no time during the legislative debate was
there any mention of the relationship between implied indemnity
and contribution. 15 8
Legislative committee comments on the Contribution Act5 9 spe-
cifically recommended that the statute not abrogate the then ex-
isting right of common-law indemnity."6° One court has argued
that the legislature's failure to incorporate this recommendation
into the statute logically implies a legislative intent to eliminate the
judicially created implied indemnity doctrine in active-passive neg-
ligence cases.' 6 ' However, an equally plausible argument can be
made for the opposite position. 62 Implied indemnity had an ex-
tended history in Illinois. 63 There was no need for the legislature
to specifically address implied indemnity because the bill covered
only cases where indemnity historically had been denied--cases
where both tortfeasors were actively negligent.
Thus, the legislative history fails to demonstrate conclusively
whether any form of implied indemnity survived enactment of the
Contribution Act. However, principles of statutory construction,
which the appellate court has yet to discuss,'"1 support the contin-
History behind Senate Bill 308, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess. [hereinafter cited as Leg-
islative History].
154. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437
(1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach.
Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
155. SENATE DEBATE, supra note 153, at 173 (remarks of Sen. Berman).
156. HOUSE DEBATE, supra note 153, at 18, 21 (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
157. Id. at 21.
158. SENATE DEBATE, supra note 153, at 173-76; HOUSE DEBATE, supra note 153, at
17-23.
159. Legislative committee comments are an appropriate and valuable source in de-
termining legislative intent. People v. Touhy, 31 111. 2d 236, 239, 201 N.E.2d 425, 427
(1964).
160. Legislative History, supra note 153, at 2.
161. Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 Ill. App. 3d 767, 773, 469 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1st Dist.
1984).
162. See Jethroe v. Koehring Co., 603 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (rejecting
the Morizzo assertion that the legislature intended to extinguish indemnity because the
Contribution Act failed specifically to reserve the right to indemnity).
163. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
164. See Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 133 Ill. App. 3d 607, 609-12, 479 N.E.2d 333, 335-
37 (5th Dist. 1985); Holmes v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 675-76, 475 N.E.2d
1383, 1389-90 (5th Dist. 1985); Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 Il. App. 3d 767, 770-74, 469
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ued vitality of implied indemnity in appropriate situations.
A basic rule of statutory construction provides that repeal of the
common law by implication is not favored. 65 Thus, since the Con-
tribution Act says nothing about implied indemnity, 66 courts
should avoid construing the Act as having repealed this common-
law right. If the Act is construed as having replaced some but not
all common-law implied indemnity, courts should not construe the
statute as having changed the common law beyond what is ex-
pressed or necessarily implied by the words of the Act. 167
The Contribution Act clearly was intended to relieve the harsh
consequences of the common-law rule against contribution.' 68 The
legislature expressed the intent that in situations where both
tortfeasors are negligent, contribution based upon the relative cul-
pability of each is to be used. 6 9 Therefore, the courts can reason-
ably infer an intent to extinguish implied indemnity based upon a
distinction between active and passive negligence. However, since
neither the Act nor the legislative history addresses the status of
implied indemnity based upon a pre-tort relationship and vicarious
or technical liability, 7 ° the courts should not read into the statute
a desire on the part of the legislature to abrogate this portion of
common-law indemnity.' 7'
This approach is consistent with appellate court decisions which
held that the Contribution Act extinguished "active-passive" im-
plied indemnity but not implied indemnity based upon a pre-tort
relationship and vicarious or technical liability.' 72 This interpreta-
N.E.2d 653, 655-58 (1st Dist. 1984); Lowe v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 96-
99, 463 N.E.2d 792, 804-06 (5th Dist. 1984); Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610,
612-13, 442 N.E.2d 979, 980-81 (1st Dist. 1981).
165. People ex. rel. Nelson v. West Englewood Trust & Say. Bank, 353 Ill. 451, 460,
187 N.E. 525, 529 (1933).
166. See supra note 63 for text of relevant portions of the Contribution Act.
167. See Lites v. Jackson, 70 Ill. App. 3d 374, 375, 387 N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (1st Dist.
1979); Northern Ill. Coal Corp. v. Langmeyer, 342 Ill. App. 406, 414, 96 N.E.2d 820, 824
(4th Dist. 1951) (citing Hamilton v. Baugh, 335 Ill. App. 346, 351, 82 N.E.2d 196, 199
(1st Dist. 1948)).
168. Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 7-9, 461 N.E.2d 382, 385-86 (1984).
169. See, e.g., HOUSE DEBATE, supra note 153, at 19 (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
170. See supra notes 63, 153.
171. See Summers v. Summers, 40 Ill. 2d 338, 342, 239 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1968) (stat-
utes in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed and nothing is to be read
into such statutes by intendment or implication).
172. See, e.g., Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 Ill. App. 3d 767, 774, 469 N.E.2d 653, 658
(1st Dist. 1984); Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 613, 422 N.E.2d 979, 981 (1st
Dist. 1981). The claim in Holmes that the Contribution Act extinguished all indemnity,
131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 676, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1390 (5th Dist. 1985); see supra notes 105-08
and accompanying text, cannot be reconciled with these principles of statutory construc-
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tion also is consistent with the recommendations of the 1976 Illi-
nois Judicial Conference.' The Judicial Conference Committee
recommended both the adoption of contribution and the retention
of implied indemnity, 7 4 but specifically provided that after the
adoption of contribution, implied indemnity should be limited to
its original common-law uses. 7 5
The conclusion that the Contribution Act replaced "active-pas-
sive" implied indemnity 176 is of no help in analyzing the Act's ef-
fect on a claim for implied indemnity based on upstream products
liability 17 where negligence is not a factor. 78 Neither the Contri-
bution Act itself nor its legislative history contains any mention of
contribution or implied indemnity claims based upon products lia-
bility. 179 No inference can be drawn from the legislative intent to
codify Skinner 18 since Skinner involved a claim for contribution
by a manufacturer against a party "downstream" from the manu-
facturer.'18  The manufacturer claimed either misuse of the prod-
uct or assumption of the risk by the downstream party.'82 Thus,
the case did not have to address the viability of a claim against the
manufacturer by the downstream joint tortfeasor.
The legislature, however, has given some indication of its intent
that indemnity claims based upon products liability survived the
Contribution Act. When legislative intent is not clear, courts often
compare the statute in question with statutes on related subjects
even though they are not strictly in pari materia. 183 Section 2-621
of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure governs the pleading of
tion. The Holmes court stated that it possessed legislative history which supported its
position, but provided no citation. Holmes, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 676, 475 N.E.2d at 1390.
173. REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 1976, at 198 (1976).
174. Id. at 217, 219.
175. Id. at 219.
176. See supra notes 148-75 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 48.
178. See Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 108 11. 2d 146, 152, 483 N.E.2d 1, 3-4
(1985) (contributory negligence is not a factor in products liability); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 82, 338 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1975) (purpose of
strict liability is best served by eliminating negligence as an element of a strict liability
action); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965)
(negligence of manufacturer no longer a necessary element in products liability).
179. See supra notes 63, 153.
180. See HOUSE DEBATE, supra note 153, at 18, 21 (remarks of Rep. Daniels).
181. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 11. 2d 1, 16, 374 N.E.2d
437, 443 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Pack-
age Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
182. Id.
183. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508 v. Taylor, 114 Ill. App.
3d 318, 323, 448 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (1st Dist. 1983).
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products liability actions. 8 4 Section 2-621(d) states: "Nothing in
this Section shall be construed. . . to affect the right of any person
to seek and obtain indemnity or contribution." '85
This provision was passed by the legislature after enactment of
the Contribution Act, and its effective date was more than one year
later than the effective date of the Contribution Act. 8 6 If the legis-
lature had intended to extinguish implied indemnity claims, or if it
had perceived that the Contribution Act extinguished such claims,
the caveat would most certainly have been limited to contractual
indemnity. 87 The legislature, therefore, appears to have expressed
its belief that both implied indemnity and contribution remain
available in products liability actions.
The Contribution Act, however, provides for contribution wher-
ever two or more tortfeasors are liable for the same injury188 and is
silent with respect to implied indemnity. 89 Whenever possible, po-
tentially conflicting statutes must be read so as to give meaning to
both. 190 Here, both Section 2-621 and the Contribution Act will
have meaning if upstream indemnity claims' 9' are permitted when
the person seeking indemnity did not misuse the product or assume
the risk of using the product, and if contribution is used to allocate
the relative culpability for the plaintiff's injury when a party down-
stream from the manufacturer of the defective product misused the
product or assumed the risk. 192
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-621 (1983).
185. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-621(d) (1983).
186. This section's effective date was September 24, 1979. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
2-621 (1983). The Contribution Act's effective date was March 1, 1978. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 70, 301 (1983).
187. See supra note 21.
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 302(a) (1983). See supra note 63 for the text of this
provision.
189. Morizzo v. Laverdure, 127 Ill. App. 3d 767, 772, 469 N.E.2d 653, 656 (1st Dist.
1984) ("[T]he Contribution Act is silent with respect to the interplay between its intent
and the right to express or implied indemnity.").
190. In re Rice's Estate, 77 Ill. App. 3d 641, 653, 396 N.E.2d 298, 308 (2d Dist.
1979); People v. Patterson, 54 Ill. App. 3d 931, 935, 370 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1st Dist. 1977)
("statutes which relate to the same subject matter must be compared and construed with
reference to each [so that effect may be given to all provisions of each] if such can be done
by reasonable and fair construction").
191. See supra note 48.
192. This interpretation is consistent with Lowe, which held that the Contribution
Act did not affect an indemnity claim based on upstream strict liability, Lowe v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 99, 463 N.E.2d 792, 806 (5th Dist. 1984); see supra notes
99-100 and accompanying text, but not Holmes, where such a claim was denied. Holmes
v. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Il1. App. 3d 666, 676, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1390 (5th Dist. 1985); see
supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The failure of the Illinois Supreme Court and General Assembly
to address the viability of implied indemnity has caused great un-
certainty. The Contribution Act's concern with equitable appor-
tionment of liability, is, however, best served by a scheme which
eliminates "active-passive" implied indemnity while preserving im-
plied indemnity as a cause of action for the tortfeasor whose liabil-
ity is solely vicarious or technical. Moreover, the public policy
which seeks to hold manufacturers liable for losses caused by de-
fective products supports a cause of action for implied indemnity
based upon upstream products liability.
Well-recognized principles of statutory construction also sup-
port the viability of implied indemnity in these circumstances.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Contribution Act or in the
Act itself supports the Holmes court's contention that the Act
eliminated all forms of implied indemnity. Rather, by preserving
implied indemnity in the vicarious or technical and products liabil-
ity situations, courts can avoid repeal of the common law by impli-
cation and give meaning to the Code of Civil Procedure's reference
to indemnity in products liability actions.
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